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LEVERAGING ANTIDISCRIMINATION
OLATUNDE JOHNSON
COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL
On turning 50, a friend of mine said: “you can’t pretend you are young anymore.”
INTRODUCTION
As the Civil Rights Act turns fifty, antidiscrimination law has become unfashionable.
For those commentators and reformers who concern themselves with addressing racial, ethnic,
and gender disparities, antidiscrimination law occupies a less central role than it did fifty years
ago, perhaps even a marginal one. The core problem, it seems, is that discrimination is a limited
explanation for current forms of contemporary inequality. Discussing race, economist Glenn
Loury has argued that discrimination should be “demoted, dislodged from its current prominent
place in the conceptual discourse on racial inequality in American life.”1 Richard Ford and
Richard Banks offer a similar assessment, arguing that if “we are legitimately concerned about
substantive disparities” then the “goal of eliminating discrimination is too modest, not ambitious
enough.”2 It is not uncommon to speak of remedying discrimination as separate from a larger
goal of addressing inequality. And civil rights strategies are posited as not up to the serious task
of improving mobility for low-wage workers or providing access into entry-level employment.
The antidiscrimination approach, it is said, is “based on the principle of freedom of individual
opportunity” which necessarily helps the more advantaged and better-trained, and is thus
inadequate for reducing substantive inequality in our society.3 If one is seeking innovations to
address poverty and inequality or to promote economic and social opportunity, much
commentary suggests that antidiscrimination law is not the place to find them.
It is not hard to harness reasons to demote “discrimination” in contemporary inequality
discourse. Discrimination remains prevalent in our society, and continues to explain extant
disparities between groups.4 However, there is much to suggest that addressing contemporary
inequities requires confronting the full range of mechanisms that disparately affect racial and

1

GLENN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 92-93 (2002).
Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter?: Law,
Politics, and Racial Inequality, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053, 1120 (2009).
3
WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR 196
(1996).
4
See, e.g., Roland G. Fryer et al., Racial Disparities in Job Finding and Offered Wages, 56 J.L. & ECON,
633, 635-36 (2011) (study finding that racial discrimination in offered wages accounted for at least one
third of the black-white wage gap); Devah Pager et al., Discrimination in a Low-Wage Labor Market: A
Field Experiment, 74 AMER. SOC. REV. 777. 792-93 (2009) (study of white, black, and Latino applicants
seeking entry-level jobs in the low-wage labor market in New York City finding that blacks were half as
likely to receive callbacks or job offers as were equally qualified whites, and that black and Latino
applicants without a criminal record were treated no better than a white applicant just released from
prison). See also KEVIN STAINBACK & DONALD TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, DOCUMENTING DESEGREGATION:
RACIAL AND GENDER SEGREGATION IN PRIVATE-SECTOR EMPLOYMENT SINCE THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
(2013).
2
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ethnic minorities and women, including improving education and training of minority workers,5
the decreasing fortune of less skilled workers,6 the effects of immigration status on social
mobility, and how geography and place structures opportunity.7 Given the complex reasons for
contemporary inequality social reform is less likely to center merely on questions of
individualized bias, but on social welfare and education programs, interventions to improve the
economic status of unskilled and semi-skilled workers, and strategies to diminish spatial
segregation and improve the conditions facing communities of concentrated poverty.
Contemporary advocates might now organize their work around narratives of social inclusion,8
or addressing spatial inequities in the distribution of opportunity.9
Yet there is a danger in casting aside the Civil Rights Act as one charts this new course.
For one, as I discuss in Part I, such a move misunderstands the force of the antidiscrimination
directive that undergirded Act, one not limited to formal discrimination or bias and which drew
on a broad set of private and public implementation tools to respond to evolving problems of
exclusion. Reminding ourselves of the implementation strategies that emerged in the first decade
after the Act, produces a richer account of what we mean by “discrimination” and attunes us to a
broader set of implementation tools than is conventionally associated with antidiscrimination
law. Second, as I show in Part II, the Civil Rights Act continues to sustain an important set of
strategies to promote inclusion. In that Part, I discuss the emergence of strategies to address
contemporary disparities under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, as well as emerging efforts
under Title VII – reminiscent of Title VII’s early years – to make Title VII more responsive to
contemporary forces shaping exclusion in labor markets.
Part III concludes with the value of retaining hold of this civil rights infrastructure, even
as reformers develop other tools and strategies for promoting equity and inclusion. My argument
here is that the Act provides an important regulatory framework for addressing problems of
exclusion facing a broad range of groups (including women and racial and ethnic minorities),
across a range of domains (education, employment, transportation, environment, agriculture and
more) and using a range of potentially powerful public and private enforcement strategies.
Transformative statutes do not come to us every day. For pragmatic as well as expressive
reasons, it is worth continuing to consider what one might wrest from the Act’s great aspiration
and powerful design.

5

See Roland Fryer, The Declining Significance of Discrimination, at 30-31 (2010), available at
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/fryer/files/racial_inequality_in_the_21st_century_the_declining_significan
ce_of_discrimination.pdf. (urging educational intervention to address the skills gap).
6
See, e.g., WILSON, supra note 3.
7
See PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE: URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE END OF PROGRESS
TOWARD RACIAL EQUALITY 67 (2013).
8
See, e.g., Center for Social Inclusion, http://www.centerforsocialinclusion.org/ (last visited Jan. 29,
2014).
9
See, e.g., INST. FOR METRO. OPPORTUNITY, http://www.law.umn.edu/metro/index.html (last visited Jan.
29, 2014); POVERTY & RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL, www.prrac.org (last visited Jan. 29, 2014);
Understanding Opportunity Mapping, KIRWAN INST., http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/opportunitycommunities/mapping/understanding-opportunity-mapping/; THE OPPORTUNITY AGENDA,
www.opportunityagenda.org.
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I. REVISITING AMBITION
Antidiscrimination is at the core of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. While the Act uses a
range of terms –Title VI of the Act provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance”10 and Title VII prohibits discrimination, as well as segregation and classification in
ways that deprive employees of opportunities11 – our collective shorthand for the Act is that it
prohibits “discrimination.”
Among those concerned with addressing contemporary race, ethnic, or gender disparities
or with promoting economic inclusion, the antidiscrimination approach typified by the Act is
often framed as inadequate.12 In part, this assessment stems from a determination that
discrimination is either in significant decline, or a fairly marginal explanation of contemporary
disparities.13 In part, this assessment also represents a critique of the strategies underlying civil
rights law: the antidiscrimination approach is seen as intertwined with an emphasis on litigation
at the expense of other approaches.14 The thrust of these critiques is that the antidiscrimination
idea centers on formal, market discrimination and bias, and is thus not sufficiently robust to be
relevant today.
However, I urge caution in characterizing the 1964 Act as centered on formal or explicit
discrimination. Rather, one can fairly characterize the Act’s regime as seeking to address a range
of institutional practices that disadvantaged blacks (the main target at the Act’s inception). By
“regime” I mean to emphasize both the Act as apparently contemplated by its initial drafters and
legislative and executive proponents, but even more by the private and public enforcement
structure that emerged in the years after its enactment.
10

42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge an individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin[.]” 42
U.S.C. §2000e-2(a). The Act also makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Id.
12
See Banks & Ford, supra note 2, at 1113-14 (contending that “many decisions and practices that
adversely affect racial minorities do not fit neatly within the conventional antidiscrimination
framework”); Glenn C. Loury, Discrimination in the Post-Civil Rights Era: Beyond Market Interactions,
12 J. ECON. PERSP. 117 (1998) (arguing that “market discrimination is only one small part of”
contemporary racial disparities). And this argument is not new. When the Civil Rights Act was not yet 25
years old, Derek Bell decried the insufficiency of antidiscrimination law in addressing ongoing “racerelated disadvantages,” noting that “[t]he harvest is past, the summer is ended, and we are not saved.”
DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 5 (1987).
13
See, e.g., Banks & Ford, supra note 2, at 1113 (doubting that racial bias “explains all or even most of
the racial injustices that plague our society”); LOURY, supra note 1, at 160 (arguing in the context of
racial inequality that thinking simply in terms of “discrimination” obscures the “causal feedback loops
that can perpetuate racial inequality from one generation to the next”).
14
See, e.g., RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, RIGHTS GONE WRONG: HOW LAW CORRUPTS THE STRUGGLE
FOR EQUALITY 11-14 (2011).
11
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The statutory history – which has been much pored over in the half a century following
passage of the Act – shows the breadth of the Act’s goals. In finally announcing support for civil
rights legislation in employment and education, President Kennedy promoted such efforts as
necessary to ensure full equality in American society and participation in economic life.15 In his
address on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives introducing the legislation, Kennedy
cast fair employment laws as part of a quest to end racial disparities in unemployment, en route
to the larger goal of assuring full employment for all workers.16 Introducing Title VI which
prohibited discrimination in federally funded programs, Kennedy expansively defined the
antidiscrimination idea underlying the legislation, declaring that: “[S]imple justice requires that
public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races contribute, not be spent in any fashion which
encourages, entrenches, subsidizes, or results in racial discrimination.”17 “Indirect
discrimination” through subsidization, Kennedy emphasized, is “invidious” discrimination.18
Legislative history from the House and Senate speaks to the goals of this new
legislation.19 The House Report to one of the bills that would culminate in the Civil Rights Act
declared that discrimination is an “urgent and most serious national problem” requiring extensive
action to eradicate exclusion in voting, public accommodation, federal financial assistance, and
employment.20 Recognizing that states had initiated important civil rights legislation, the House
Report nevertheless recognized the need for national action: “in the last decade it has become
increasingly clear that progress has been too slow and that national legislation is required to meet
a national need.”21 In addition, the legislature identified goals that went beyond market
discrimination emphasizing that discrimination was not limited to explicit exclusionary actions,
but “ranges in degrees from patent absolute rejection to more subtle forms of invidious
distinctions.”22 As an example, this House Report alluded to the effect of seemingly racially
neutral practices such as “last hired, first fired” and to the relegation of minorities “to
‘traditional’ positions and through discriminatory promotion practices.”23 Occupational
segregation was achieved through “traditional expectations” as well as the segregation of
minorities in “involuntary part-time work.”24 Discrimination could be subtle: the House Report
noted that while employment agencies often engaged in “outright refusal to deal with minority
group applications,” as prevalent was the refusal to refer minorities due to “expressed
agreements, tacit understandings, and assumptions based on traditional practices.”25 In this
15

See Civil Rights and Job Opportunities, 109 Cong. Rec. 11,175 (1963) (statement of John F. Kennedy,
President of the United States).
16
See id.
17
Id. at 11,178.
18
Id.
19
See H.R. REP. NO. 570 (1963). This report accompanies the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1963, the “nominal” ancestor to Title VII. H.R. 405, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). See Francis J. Vaas,
Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 431, 433 n.10 (1966).
20
H.R. No. 814 (to accompany H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), at 2 (citing evidence from
hearing making it “abundantly clear that job opportunity discrimination permeates the national social
fabric-North, South, East and West”).
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 3.
24
Id. at 3.
25
Id.
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congressional history, labor and entry-level jobs emerge as a particular point of focus. The House
Report refers to efforts to improve opportunities in construction unions, and ensure access to
apprenticeship training programs often run by labor unions because of the crucial role these
pathways played in “improving the skills, knowledge and capability of” workers.26
To be sure, key portions of the legislative history of the Act reveal legislative concerns
about avoiding race-conscious action or intrusions into the “prerogatives” of management
(prefiguring subsequent debates in Title VII over the extent to which the Act should be
interpreted to allow disparate impact or affirmative action27). And forces aligned against the Act
sought to minimize administrative power to implement Title VII, most notably succeeding in
diminishing the powers of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.28 Yet, this journey
into the statutory history is meant to check modern characterizations of the antidiscrimination
goal as aimed at simply removing explicit or blatant barriers or disconnected from the goal of
economic opportunity. Instead, the legislative history offers a more richly conceived notion of
the degree to which discrimination was embedded in employment and credentialing institutions
such as unions, the range of explicit and implicit barriers to inclusion, and the connection
between the antidiscrimination method and achieving fuller economic participation.
The ambition of the Act is further revealed when we consider the Act’s implementation
context – the strategies that public and private actors undertook to implement and enforce the
Act. Implementation would come to include strategies to: (1) define the Act broadly to reach
more than intentional discrimination; (2) leveraging administrative and private resources for
systemic enforcement; and (3) requiring regulated actors to take affirmative inclusionary steps.
The move beyond intentional discrimination is seen most sharply in the public and
private implementation of the Act to reach actions with an unjustified disparate impact. Within
the year after passage of the Act, federal agencies charged with implementing Title VI of the Act
interpreted the provision to reach not just actions by funding recipients that were intentional, but

26

Id.
See, e.g., United Steel Workers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (holding that Title VII
permitted voluntary race-conscious affirmative action plan over dissent’s claim that the language and
legislative history of the Act did not permit “quotas” or racial “preference[s]”); Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 670 (1987) (extending Weber to gender-based affirmative action and rejecting
dissent’s argument that Weber “rewrote the statute it purported to construe”).
28
Civil rights reformers had advocated for a strong fair employment agency akin to the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) with power to enforce antidiscrimination laws through a cease-and-desist
power. Instead, legislative compromises meant an EEOC with limited power – charged only with the
power to investigate claims and mediate disputes. See Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7
B.C. L. REV. 431, 453 (1966) (detailing Title VII legislative proposals for strong enforcement agency);
Robert C. Lieberman, Private Power and American Bureaucracy: The EEOC and Civil Rights
Enforcement 1-2 (Colum. Univ. Dep’t of Political Science, Working Paper, 2010) available at
http://web1.millercenter.org/apd/colloquia/pdf/col_2005_0318_lieberman.pdf (“As originally conceived
by civil rights advocates, the EEOC was to have full regulatory powers, particularly the power to issue
binding cease-and-desist orders to employers.”). Until 1972, the EEOC even lacked power to sue private
employers in its own name. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(1972).
27
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those that had the “effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination.”29 (Notably these
regulations were drafted by the agencies, with the involvement of private actors and the White
House, and formally approved by the President.) What we now understand as the disparate
impact standard in employment grew in part out of the guidelines issued by the EEOC on
employment tests, in response to the adoption by southern employers of formally race-neutral
practices that operated to discriminate.30 Two years after passage of the Act, the EEOC issued
guidance instructing employers to administer an occupational test only where it “fairly measures
the knowledge or skills required by the particular job or class of job.”31 A few years later, the
EEOC issued additional guidelines requiring that employers using tests have “available ‘data
demonstrating that the test is predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of
work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being
evaluated.’”32 It was in giving “substantial deference” to the EEOC in Griggs v. Duke Power that
the Supreme Court allowed that the Act prohibited in some cases employers’ facially neutral
practices that, in fact are “discriminatory in operation.” 33
Commentators have debated whether the EEOC’s move interpreting the Act to reach
disparate impact claims was distorting the meaning of a statute centered on disparate treatment
and colorblindness, or whether this move was supported by the language and prevailing

45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1965) (“a recipient . . . may not directly or through contractual or other
arrangements, utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals
to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin, or have the effect of defeating or
substantially impairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program as respect individuals race,
color, or national origin.”) (emphasis added). These regulations were created by a task force consisting of
the White House, the Civil Rights Commission, the Justice Department and the Bureau of the Budget. See
Comment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 – Implementation and Impact, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
824 (1968). Each agency drafted a rule, submitted it to the Department of Justice, which then participated
in the task force to draft these rules. Id. The task force first developed regulations for HEW which then
became the model for other federal agencies. Id
30
See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL
POLICY 1960-1972 (1991); Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and
the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972) (stating that during the one-year
delay in enforcing the 1964 Civil Rights Act instead of pursuing voluntary compliance with the Act,
many southern employers “adopted seemingly neutral personnel policies, which, in fact, perpetuated the
subordinate position of black workers” including tests and educational requirements) (footnote omitted).
31
Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 433 n.9 (quoting and construing Equal Opportunity Commission
(EOC) Guidelines on Employment Testing Procedures (Aug. 24, 1966)).
32
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1970); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433 n.9
(1971) (relying on 1970 guidelines).
33
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
29
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understandings of “discrimination.” 34 Regardless of the position one takes on fidelity to the
language or the original legislative deal, the point here is that these early moves by the EEOC
implement the Act in ways that reached beyond thin notions of formal discrimination. Instead,
the meaning of antidiscrimination emerges in response to the efforts to address the evolving
barriers facing workers.
Second, public and private enforcement strategies focused on opening up large scale
institutions to black workers by targeting salient industries and leveraging systemic tools such as
regulatory guidance, investigations and hearings, and using litigation mechanisms such as the
class action device and pattern and practice authority. As other commentators have shown, the
EEOC adopted structurally oriented strategies –– interpreting language in Title VII to permit it to
collect data on the racial composition of employers; 35 using this data to systemically publicize
and investigate problems of labor market discrimination in particular regions, sectors and
industries.36 Private enforcement also followed a systemic approach that targeted particular

34

Compare PAUL D. MORENO, FROM DIRECT ACTION TO AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: FAIR EMPLOYMENT
LAW AND POLICY IN AMERICA 1933-1972 1-2 (1999) (introducing “disparate impact” as a deviation from
the “unequal treatment” colorblindness mandate that undergirded civil rights laws) and JOHN DAVID
SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLITICS, CULTURE & JUSTICE IN AMERICA 120-21,
127-131(1996) (describing developments such a racial reporting and disparate impact as moving away
from the “color-blind approach” of Title VII which focused on the intent of the discriminator), with Susan
D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251, 294-97
(2011) (describing how disparate impact standards drew on existing theories of discrimination evident in
the practices of state fair employment commissions) and George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under
Title VII: An Objective Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1306-07 (1987) (describing
disparate impact as an appropriate common law gap filling given the absence of a definition of
“discrimination” in the statute).
35
See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-8(c); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1602.7-1602.14. The EEOC developed what are known now
as the EEO-1 Form (the Employer Information Reports form) which requires certain employers to collect
and report data on their employees’ race, ethnicity, and sex.
36
See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Administrative Creativity: The First Year of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 694, 711-20 (1970). As sociologist John Sktrentny has
observed, the EEO-1 Forms allowed EEOC administrators to move beyond an individual approach: “the
administrators could sit back and look at entire industries or geographic areas, and see racial differences
not just freely contracting, abstract individuals.” SKRENTNY, supra note 34, at 131. The EEOC used this
data to develop “conciliation” plans that required employers to adopt particular hiring practices and
affirmative remedies, and to hold forums that brought public attention to the employment practices of
major industries. See Robert C. Lieberman, Private Power and American Bureaucracy: The EEOC and
Civil Rights Enforcement 27-28 (Colum. Univ. Dep’t. of Political Science, Working Paper, 2010) (relying
on EEOC research report outlining potential use of EEO-1 data to file “commissioner charges” of
discrimination – which did not require a specific plaintiff’s coming forward—and to develop “technical
assistance” programs to work with employers with discriminatory practices); see SKRENTNY, supra note
34, at 132 (describing forum on hiring practices for the textile industry in the Carolinas which included
forty witnesses representing management, labor, government and private industries); see id. (noting
forums on white-collar employment and the pharmaceutical industry).
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industries,37 employed the class-action device,38 and that sought to take aim at a range of
exclusionary practices, in particular the use of non-job related occupational tests,39 and
exclusionary seniority practices.40 As former NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) attorney
Robert Belton has explained: “by 1965 overt discrimination on the basis of race was not
fashionable.”41 Instead, LDF harnessed an approach to challenge “superficially neutral practices,
such as testing and educational devices or seniority systems that appeared facially neutral or
color-blind but operated to perpetuate the effects of past discrimination[]”42 and “systemic
discrimination imbedded in basic personnel policies or organizational structures of companies
and unions.”43
Third, the enforcement agency used its regulatory power to promote goals apart from the
litigation context. While the EEOC (designed to be a weak enforcement agency) lacked (and still
lacks) power to issue binding substantive regulations to enforce Title VII, 44 the agency
developed guidelines on how to avoid discriminatory practices such as seniority systems, and
most famously on the use of occupational tests. Robert Lieberman has described these guidelines
as emerging out of the EEOC’s investigation and conciliation power – an attempt by the EEOC
to provide a guide for “employers and employees about what practices the commission would
find acceptable and unacceptable in probable cause determinations.”45
This implementation context reveals a robust conception of the antidiscrimination
directive at the core of the Act – one that reaches beyond explicit practices to reach subtle,
embedded mechanisms that excluded or inhibited opportunities for black workers. In addition
this review of the implementation context makes clear that reformers employed a range of
strategies to move the Act beyond the redress of individual claims. This is manifest in the
leveraging of federal contracting and spending power, the requirement of affirmative
inclusionary strategies, the reliance on administrative investigations and regulatory guidance, the
use of the class-action device, and the attempt to connect the work of private litigators and
37

LDF and other civil rights and labor activists early on targeted particular industries in the South,
including the textile industry, the paper industry, and the steel industry that were large sources of nonfarm employment and provided more lucrative wages than many blacks were then earning. See id. See
also NANCY MACLEAN, FREEDOM IS NOT ENOUGH: THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 79
(2008) (detailing that the NAACP and the EEOC targeted textile mills because they were the largest nonfarm employer of workers with limited education and supplied “more than half of all industrial jobs in the
Carolinas and Georgia” and explaining that these jobs though hard, paid higher wages than what was
available to most black men and women at the time).
38
See Robert Belton, A Comparative Review of Public and Private Enforcement of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 31 VAND. L. REV. 905, 930 (1978). The late Professor Robert Belton served as an
attorney at the NAACP LDF during this period. Id.
39
See id. at 936-38 (detailing LDF’s litigation efforts in Griggs).
40
See id. at 945-46 (describing litigation culminating in Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th
Cir. 1971)).
41
Id. at 927.
42
Id.
43
See id. at 928.
44
See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-1 (directing EEOC to issue “suitable procedural regulations to carry out the
provisions of this subchapter”).
45
Lieberman, supra note 36, at 28.
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community-based organizations. Finally, this context reveals that antidiscrimination strategies
would be cognizant of the realities of the industrial economy at that time and connected to core
questions of social and economic equality. For instance, the paradigm beneficiary of Title VII
was the blue-collar worker, evident in reformers’ focus on manufacturing and construction
industries and on organized labor. In its goals and implementation, the Act centered on opening
up access to jobs with training and career ladders, and on providing avenues for the acquisition
of skills.
By some key accounts, this enforcement approach contributed significantly to improving
the social and economic status of blacks in the late 1960s and early 1970s46 and to substantial
progress in the desegregation of schools.47 However, I do not want to overstate the success or
ambition of these public-private strategies48 or to ignore the possibility of even more
transformative paths that might have been pursued particularly with regard to reform of labor
institutions.49 What I propose is in the spirit of correcting how we often regard
“antidiscrimination” today – a useful check on our modern tendency to characterize the
antidiscrimination idea at the center of the Act as limited to a concern about individual bias, as
too court-centered, insufficiently structural, or attenuated from core questions of access to
opportunity.
II. CLAIMING RELEVANCE
Today, much of how commentators understand the relevance and capacity of
antidiscrimination law is shaped by regimes of court enforcement and by Title VII litigation in
particular. Title VII generates more litigation than any other portion of the Act. Title VII cases
more frequently gain hearing at the Supreme Court than litigation involving other provisions of

46

See John J. Donohue III & James Heckman, Continuous Versus Episodic Change: The Impact of Civil
Rights Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks, 29 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1603, 1641 (1991) (providing
evidence that enforcement of federal civil rights law, including Title VII, “was the major contributor to
the sustained improvement in black economic status that began in 1965[]”); id. at 1637-38 (“[M]uch of
the black improvement in the decade following enactment of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act came
in the South”); id. (detailing the role of federal promotion of school integration and enforcement of Title
VII). See also MACLEAN, supra note 37, at 80 (quoting labor organizers in the 1960s who credited federal
executive order on nondiscrimination in government contractors with opening up positions for blacks in
Southern textile mills); id. at 88 (detailing increased hiring of black workers by Southern textile workers
and the contribution manufacturing employment made to the economic status of blacks in the South);
Jonathan S. Leonard, The Impact of Affirmative Action Regulation & Equal Employment Law on Black
Employment, 4 J. OF ECON. PERSP. 47 (1990).
47
In the area of education, key researchers have credited Title VI and its implementing guidelines with
“provid[ing] the standard operating principles” that enabled key advances in school integration. GARY
ORFIELD, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOUTHERN EDUCATION: THE SCHOOLS AND THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT 101 (1969).
48
See, e.g., Paul Frymer, Acting When Elected Officials Won’t: Federal Courts and Civil Rights
Enforcement in U.S Labor Unions 1935-85, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 483, 483-99; Lieberman, supra note
36 (providing account of the EEOC’s backlog in processing individual complaints in the late 1960s and
early 1970s).
49
See RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2010).
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the Act (or other civil rights statutes).50 And Title VII commands the greatest share of
commentary about the Act in the legal academic literature. Title VII’s rise and prominence has
coincided with a move away from the earlier more systemic or “structural” focus of the Act. For
instance, while individual Title VII cases have continued to rise since the Act’s inception, pattern
and practice and class-action litigation has fallen. 51 And, even as the overall volume of litigation
has increased, litigation has shifted away from the hiring discrimination cases that prevailed in
Title VII’s earlier years which sought to open up opportunity for previously excluded workers in
economically salient industries, towards more individual claims of termination. This is a trend
that researchers identified in the early 1990s before passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
(which through damages and other mechanisms increased incentives to bring Title VII claims),52
and that has continued in the subsequent years.53 Attorneys on the ground have noted the irony of
this interplay between the Civil Rights Act of 1991’s strengthening of Title VII through a
damage regime, and the decline of systemic reform litigation.54 Some of these changes in the
shape of litigation no doubt reflect Title VII’s success in creating incentives for fairer

50

For recent Title VII cases, see Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (requiring
a showing of “but for” causation to recover for claims of retaliation); Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct.
2434, 2439 (2013) (defining “supervisor” for the purposes of Title VII as one “empowered by the
employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim”); Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S.
205 (2010) (holding that a plaintiff who fails to file a timely charge when a disparate impact practice is
adopted, may challenge the later application of that practice in a disparate impact suit); Ricci v.
DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009) (holding that employers may take race-conscious steps to avoid disparate
impact liability under the Act only where there is a “a strong basis in evidence” of such liability).
51
After 1991, the volume of charges filed with the EEOC involving Title VII claims of gender, race,
national origin and religion discrimination increased over the prior years. See Sean Farhang,
Congressional Mobilization of Private Litigants: Evidence from the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 6 J. EMP.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (2009). Farhang’s data consists of charges with the EEOC, which though they are a
precondition to court filing, do not in all cases lead to court filing. Since at least the 1980s, commentators
have identified patterns of declining class action. See J. LeVonne Chambers & Barry Goldstein, Title VII
at Twenty: The Continuing Challenge, 1 LAB. LAW. 235, 238 (1985).
52
See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 43 STAN L. REV. 983, 1015-17 (1991) (while hiring cases dominated EEOC and court dockets
in 1966, by 1985 wrongful termination charges significantly outnumbered hiring cases).
53
See Statute By Issue, FY 2010 – FY 2012, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/statutes_by_issue.cfm (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (EEOC
charge data from Fiscal Years 2010, 2011, 2012 showing that discharge complaints outnumbered hiring
complaints by 9 to 1).
54
As two legal services’ attorneys noted several years ago: “the volume of employment discrimination
litigation has produced more aggressive gatekeeping by the courts, even as the lawsuits that offer the most
hope for long term economic security for our clients — by opening jobs and pathways to advancement —
become increasingly rare.” Sharon M. Dietrich & Noah Zatz, A Practical Legal Services Approach to
Addressing Racial Discrimination in Employment, 36 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 39, 42 (2002).
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employment practices and the provision’s salience.55 Still, with the individual Title VII case in
mind, one might come to understand the Act as centered on individual bias; one might have
reason to question the Act’s broader relevance to contemporary forces and patterns of exclusion.
Yet, focusing on Title VII’s enforcement in individual cases pays insufficient heed to
other provisions of the Act such as Title VI, which do not operate primarily in courts or as a tool
for redress of individualized bias claims. In addition, emphasizing court enforcement in
individual cases overlooks the broader regulatory tools of the Act – in both Title VI and Title
VII—that can reach beyond ex post court enforcement in individual cases and that can operate to
promote or encourage inclusion, and disrupt patterns of exclusion.
To begin with Title VII, as the story of the 1964 Act’s early history shows, effective
implementation of Title VII depended not just on litigation in individual cases but on use of a
broad set of tools, including private class action and agency pattern and practice litigation,
regulatory guidance, industry targeting, data analysis, and investigations. Furthermore,
implementation of Title VII depended not just on narrow conceptions of discrimination centered
on market bias or prejudice, but on the use of these hybrid enforcement tools to address a set of
on-the-ground, evolving practices that inhibited opportunity for workers and to open up key
institutions and industries.
At the outset, it is worth noting even as Title VII litigation today is hobbled by significant
doctrinal constraints,56 such litigation has continued capacity to address patterns of group
exclusion, and reform organizational practices. Class actions, pattern and practice, and hiring
cases may have declined relative to the early years of Title VII enforcement, but they are not
extinct. In recent years, privately initiated Title VII litigation has sought to address exclusionary
employment practices by public agencies that exclude minority workers,57 and practices such as
steering and downward channeling that perpetuate occupational segregation in lower-skilled,

55

See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE
UNITED STATES 29-31 (2010) (reviewing available empirical evidence and concluding that the threat of
private enforcement litigation in particular regions led employers to adopt equal opportunity practices that
improved the employment status of women and minorities). Laws, private enforcement, and regulatory
action can also lead to the creation of rules and organizational structures within organizations to promote
diversity and equal opportunity. See, e.g., John R. Sutton & Frank Dobbin, The Two Faces of
Governance: Responses to Legal Uncertainty in U.S. Firms, 1955 to 1985, 61 AM. SOC. REV. 794 (1996);
Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights
Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531 (1992). (At the same time, this literature also questions whether this
organizational compliance leads to substantive change).
56
See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 458, 467-68 (2001) (describing limitations of Title VII law in addressing contemporary,
second generation discrimination which involves “patterns of interaction among groups within the
workplace that, over time, exclude nondominant groups.”)
57
See, e.g., Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205 (2010) (litigation successfully brought against the
Chicago Fire Department for the use of written tests with a unjustified disparate impact on black
applicants); U.S. v. City of New York, 717 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding selection practices of the Fire
Department of New York to have an unjustified disparate impact on Latino and black applicants).
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service sector employment.58 Litigation in this vein maintains relevance by taking aim at
systemic practices and targeting pathways, training institutions like public employment and
unions – a traditional focus of Title VII—as well the service sector in which large numbers of
women and workers of color are employed (though often in the lowest ranks).
Moreover, innovative litigation stems from important collaborations between
antidiscrimination lawyers and groups that organize not around questions of discrimination but
toward the goals of improving the condition of workers within particular industries. One group
that has received some attention in the academic literature in recent years is the Restaurant
Opportunities Center of New York (ROC-NY), which seeks to improve the working conditions
and pay of restaurant workers in fine dining establishments in New York City. The group
organizes restaurant workers to address wage and hour violations by employers and improve
benefits like sick or parenting-related leave.59 Yet, central to the group’s mission is addressing
what the group sees as pervasive discrimination and occupational segregation in the restaurant
industry. Much as public and private implementers used the data collected by the EEOC to
highlight the exclusion of black workers by Southern manufacturers, ROC-NY also publicizes
practices in the restaurant industry that limit opportunity for women, immigrant workers, and
workers of color.60 ROC-NY relies on audit testing — that classic tool of antidiscrimination
enforcement used most extensively in the fair housing context61 — to document discrimination
in hiring for particular restaurant positions.62 In addition, while the group’s strategies center on
organizing and policy reform, ROC-NY partners with private attorneys to litigate discrimination
58

See, e.g., Wright v. Stern, 553 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (settling claims of systemic
discrimination against the New York City Park departments for racially segregated job assignments and
discrimination in pay and promotion); Settlement Agreement and Joint Stipulation, Cogdell v. Wet Seal,
Inc., No. SACV 12-01138 AG (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2013), ECF No. 78-1 (settling claims of systemic
discrimination in hiring and promotion by large retailer).
59
See, e.g., REST. OPPORTUNITIES CTR. OF N.Y. UNITED & N.Y.C. REST. INDUS. COAL., THE THIRD
SHIFT: CHILD CARE NEEDS AND ACCESS FOR WORKING MOTHERS IN RESTAURANTS (2013),
http://rocny.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/ChildCare-Report-Final.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2013)
[hereinafter THE THIRD SHIFT].
60
See REST. OPPORTUNITIES CTR. OF N.Y. UNITED & N.Y.C. REST. INDUS. COAL., THE GREAT SERVICE
DIVIDE: OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION AND INEQUALITY IN THE RESTAURANT INDUSTRY (2009)
(reporting findings on discrimination in hiring, pay, promotion and training opportunities) [hereinafter
THE GREAT SERVICE DIVIDE].
61
Testers have been used most prominently to address housing discrimination and the Supreme Court has
held that the Fair Housing Act provides standing for fair housing testers. See Havens Realty Corp. v.
Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (holding that section 804(d) of the Fair Housing Act’s language making it
illegal to “‘represent to any person . . . that any dwelling is not available for inspection, sale, or rental
when such dwelling is in fact so available’” provides a sufficient basis for standing) (citation omitted).;
Olatunde Johnson, The Last Plank: Rethinking Public and Private Power to Advance Fair Housing, 13 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1191, 1198-99 (2011) (describing use of audit testing to document and address
discrimination in housing).
62
Researcher Mark Bendick conducted the matched pair audits of 138 fine dining restaurants and found
pervasive discrimination in hiring for server positions. See THE GREAT SERVICE DIVIDE, supra note 60, at
2, 24. Specifically, the study found that testers of color were only 54 percent as likely as white testers to
be offered server positions, and were less likely to receive a job interview. See id. at 54 (81.4% of white
testers were granted an interview, compared to 60.5% for testers of color). White testers who received a
job interview were more likely to be offered a job than testers of color.
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cases, securing remedies in individual and group litigation. Significantly, ROC-NY leverages its
investigations into discriminatory practices, its deep knowledge of the industry, its representation
of workers, and its litigation successes to publicize exclusionary practices (such as the lack of
formal and transparent practices for hiring, training and promotion), advocate for specific reform
interventions, and celebrate and involve employers that perpetuate best practices in the
industry.63
There is evidence too of revitalization of the type of public systemic enforcement that
gave Title VII its salience in the early years of the Civil Rights Act. The EEOC has long been
seen as a broken enforcement agency. Historically overtaxed and under resourced, the increase in
Title VII and other employment discrimination cases in the 1990s created additional pressures on
the EEOC since Title VII and most other employment claims must first be filed with the
agency.64 And there are serious questions about whether the agency has adapted to accommodate
this crush of complaints. Indeed, if the early EEOC sought to move away from the volume of
individual complaints by focusing on systemic remedies and investigations, accounts of the
EEOC in the 1990s and 2000s suggest an agency paralyzed by processing individual
complaints.65 The EEOC, too, has recognized its need to enhance its systemic litigation
program.66
But rather than wholly abandon the prospect of wresting more from this flawed public
enforcement mechanism, it seems worth devoting creative attention to strategies for
strengthening the regime. After all, the EEOC has formal tools and capacity unavailable to
private litigants. Unlike private litigants, the EEOC can maintain systemic litigation without
meeting the requirements of class action Rule 2367 (the difficulties in meeting the rule’s

63

See id. (offering recommendations for industry changes); REST. OPPORTUNITIES CTR. OF N.Y. UNITED
& N.Y.C. REST. INDUS. COAL., http://rocny.org/high-road-organizing/ (listing restaurants that take the
“high road” by providing safe working conditions, complying with wage and hour law, and providing
formal and transparent policies for employment opportunities and grievances).
64
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (e), (f) (2006) (detailing the procedures for filing a Title VII charge with
the EEOC and for bringing claims in court).
65
See Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the Agency’s Role in Employment
Discrimination Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 7-10, 21-22 (1996) (concluding that the agency has capacity to
investigate only a few cases and in the end it determines that most claims have no merit). In the words of
one commentator, the “EEOC has been forced to focus on handling charges instead of pursuing
enforcement initiatives.” Michael Z. Green, Proposing a New Paradigm for EEOC Enforcement After 35
Years: Outsourcing Charge Processing by Mandatory Mediation, 105 DICK L. REV. 305, 309-10 (2001).
66
See Leslie E. Silverman, Systemic Task Force Report to the Chair of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission 4-5 available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_reports/upload/systemic.pdf.
(listing deficiencies of current EEOC systems for tackling systemic discrimination)
67
See id. at 2 (noting that EEOC was well-positioned to tackle systemic discrimination because “ unlike
private litigants, EEOC need not meet the stringent requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in order to maintain a class suit in federal court”)..
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requirements have hampered private class actions in recent years68). The EEOC can also pursue
investigations without an actual complainant, by filing a commissioner’s charge.69 More, the
EEOC can pursue conciliations, hold hearings to investigate patterns of discrimination, collect
data, and issue regulatory guidance.
To reverse its slide away from systemic litigation, the EEOC has recently announced a
renewed focus on systemic discrimination, developing a plan for doing so after extensive
consultation with experts and advocates.70 Indeed in the last three years, the EEOC has begun to
bring more pattern and practice litigation; in 2012, it significantly increased its recoveries against
employers in systemic discrimination cases over prior years.71 The EEOC has announced an
increased emphasis on preventing employment discrimination through education and outreach,
including by partnering with community groups to focus on the most disadvantaged workers and
underserved communities.72 And, the EEOC has instituted important regulatory guidance on
current barriers facing workers, notably revising its prior guidance on best practices in
considering an applicant’s criminal history.73
I offer these examples not to deem them successes – success remains to be fully seen.
The EEOC has had prominent setbacks in its recent systemic disparate impact litigation.74
Further, the EEOC could utilize its existing powers more effectively. For instance, the EEOC
might increase its ability to identify industries with discriminatory employment practices and to
68

See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011) (holding 5-4 that plaintiffs lacked the
“commonality” of factual and legal claims required to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)); id.
(holding unanimously that plaintiffs claims for back pay could not be certified pursuant to 23(b)(2)); see
also Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive?, 37 AKRON L. REV. 813, 82027 (2004) (describing pre-Wal-Mart lower courts’ constraints on use of 23(b)(2) certification – the
traditional route for class certification in employment discrimination class actions – in cases involving
compensatory and punitive damages).
69
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (outlining EEOC’s commissioner’s charges procedure).
70
See EEOC, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012-2016 (2012) (outlining renewed focused on
systemic and pattern and practice litigation), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/sep.pdf.
71
Id. (noting four fold increase in the amount of damages recovered from employers in systemic
discrimination cases between FY 2012 and FY 2011). See EEOC, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR FISCAL YEARS
2007-2012 (2006) available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/strategic_plan_07to12_mod.pdf.
72
See EEOC, supra note 69; EEOC, Performance and Accountability Report: FY 2012, available at
www.Eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/2012par_performance.cfm (last visited Feb. 3, 2014).
73
See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE NO. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE
CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII
OF
THE
CIVIL
RIGHTS
ACT
OF
1963
(2012),
available
at
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/upload/arrest_conviction.pdf (issuing guidance on how employers
might avoid disparate impact discrimination in the consideration of arrest and conviction records in
employment decisions).
74
See EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Education Corp., No. 01:10 CV 2882, 2013 WL 322116 (N.D. Ohio, Jan.
28, 2013) (dismissing EEOC’s suit against an employer for screening applicants based on credit histories,
holding that expert’s evidence of disparate impact was inadmissible); EEOC v. Freeman, No. RWT-09CV-2573, 2013 WL 4464553 (D. Md. Aug. 9, 2013) (granting summary judgment to employer in case
involving claims of discriminatory impact of criminal and credit history background checks on minority
applicants, holding that expert testimony was unreliable and that disparate impact was not caused by a
specific employment practice).
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analyze the EEO-1 and other data that it collects on private employers.75 EEOC could use data to
hold hearings on problematic industry practices, disseminate information and best practices,
generate regulatory guidance, and pursue litigation. Another tool that the EEOC might deploy,
perhaps in conjunction with nongovernmental organizations and nonprofits, is the use of audit
studies to identify hiring discrimination. While courts are not settled on the ability of
employment testers to recover damages and injunctive relief,76 the results of audit studies might
still prove useful for conducting investigations and for providing insight into industry practices.77
But the agency’s current emphasis recaptures the focus on systemic discrimination – it attunes us
to the possibilities that might still remain in a Title VII that moves beyond a focus on individual
litigation.
The other key provision of the Act — Title VI— has also served as an important location
in recent years for addressing contemporary problems of exclusion. Title VI differs from Title
VII in that its central enforcement target is not private industry but federal agencies and grantees.
Its key mode of enforcement is not litigation but administrative regulation, backed by the threat
of funding withdrawal. In recent years, regulatory enforcement of Title VI has yielded an
75

See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Intentional Job Discrimination in Metropolitan America 4 (2002)
(unpublished paper) (on file with author) (describing the EEOC’s failure to make consistent use of EEO-1
data over the period stemming from 1965 through late 1990s). Even when the EEOC has displayed the
political will to utilize this data, it has not been able to make good use of this data because it lacked
internal resources (staff and technological systems) for adequate data analysis. See STAINBACK &
TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, supra note 4. Also, the EEOC has failed to organize collect, organize and tabulate
the data in effective ways. See EEOC, SYSTEMATIC TASK FORCE REPORT (2006), n.37, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_reports/upload/systemic.pdf (recommending that EEOC organize data to
allow for automatic generation of reports on firms and their subsidiaries and comparative analysis
between firms within an industry or relevant labor market).
76
The Supreme Court has not ruled on the question of whether Title VII grants standing for employment
testers (Title VII has different language from the FHA) and lower courts are split on the question.
Compare Fair Employment Council of Greater Wash., Inc. v. BMC Mktg. Corp., 28 F.3d 1268 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (finding that employment testers lacked standing to sue because they did not actually intend to form
an employment contract with the employer, though allowing organizational standing for group that
sponsored the testers) with Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289, 297 (7th Cir. 2000)
(finding that employment testers had standing to sue under Title VII, reasoning that FHA and Title VII
both take “broad aim at discrimination in their respective sectors and in that sense are the functional
equivalents of one another”). In regulatory guidance, the EEOC has taken the position that testers can file
charges and litigate claims of employment discrimination. See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE NO.
915.002, WHETHER “TESTERS” CAN FILE CHARGES AND LITIGATE CLAIMS OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION (1996), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/testers.html.
77
The EEOC has in recent years indicated that it will “explore the use of matched-pair testing,” see
Eradicating Racism & Colorism from Employment, EEOC www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/initiatives/erace/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 3, 2014),, but currently operates no testing program. The EEOC has tried
to initiate matched-pair testing over the past several decades but has abandoned the project in the face of
opposition from some members of Congress. See Michael Yelnosky, Testers Revisited (Roger Williams
Law Sch. Legal Stud. Working Paper, Research Paper No. 74, 2009) (describing how in 1998 Congress
conditioned a budgetary increase for the EEOC on the agency’s abandoning its request for funding for
testers). The EEOC has directed funding to private groups to conduct such testing. See id. at 5 (noting that
after Congress blocked EEOC’s testing program, the agency provided $200,000 to private groups to carry
out a testing program).

15

JOHNSON, LEVERAGING ANTIDISCRIMINATION
DRAFT: PLEASE DO NOT CITE OR CIRCULATE WITHOUT PERMISSION.

important array of regulations that place affirmative requirements of inclusion on grantees.
Implementing Title VI, the Department of Agriculture requires federal agencies administering
agriculture, forestry, food, and nutrition programs to undertake ongoing analyses to ensure that
minorities benefit from these federally funded programs.78 Federally funded public transit and
highway programs must take affirmative steps to assess the impacts of their programs on
minorities and persons with limited English proficiency, adopt mitigating alternatives, and must
include minority groups in their planning.79 In an account of these directives in mass transit, I
showed how they required grantees to incorporate impact assessments in their planning, engage
in best practices for ensuring participation of covered groups, and design inclusionary
alternatives.80
These Title VI directives bear on the debate about the relevance of discrimination law
today: they extend beyond individual bias, and their implementation depends not on ex post
enforcement by courts (although litigation may sometimes play a role in enforcement) but on
implementation by regulated actors. In addition, these directives intervene in regulatory domains
that are linchpins for determining inclusion and opportunity distribution today. For instance,
mass transportation policy and design has strong effects on economic mobility — high minority
and poor communities are often disconnected from important job centers — and access to
transportation is a key determinant of the distribution of resources and patterns of racial
segregation and concentrated poverty across a metropolitan region.81 By encouraging inclusion
of the needs of minority communities in design decisions, promoting ongoing equity assessments
and mitigation, Title VI mass transit directives seek to interrupt the reproduction of existing,
unequal patterns of transportation access and the attendant spatial inequalities. In addition, as in
the employment example described above, these Title VI directives are harnessed by groups that
do not centrally organize around questions of antidiscrimination – but who instead organize their

See OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., DR 4300-4, CIVIL RIGHTS IMPACT ANALYSIS 1
(2003), available at http://www.ocio.usda.gov/directives/doc/DR4300-4.pdf (requiring that agency
grantees conduct a “civil rights impact analysis”).
79
See 49 C.F.R. pt. 21 (2011) (imposing duties of nondiscrimination, assessment of impacts, and
inclusion on federal grantees). FED. TRANSIT ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., CIRCULAR FTA C
4702.1A, TITLE VI AND TITLE VI-DEPENDENT GUIDELINES FOR FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION
RECIPIENTS 11-1 (2007) (listing goals of regulation as preventing disparities, promoting participation, and
ensuring access to transportation by all groups); FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NO.
6640.23A, FHWA ACTIONS TO ADDRESS ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN MINORITY POPULATIONS AND
LOW-INCOME
POPULATIONS
(June
14,
2012),
available
at
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/legsregs/directives/orders/6640_23.htm.
80
Olatunde C. A. Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney General: Equality Directives in American Law,
87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1339, 1384-86 (2012).
81
See, e.g., Thomas W. Sanchez, The Impact of Public Transportation on U.S. Metropolitan Wage
Inequality, 39 URB. STUD. 423, 434 (2002) (showing links between the availability of public
transportation and wage inequality in large metropolitan areas). The effect of transportation on
segregation is well-documented. See generally KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE
SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES (1985) (detailing the contribution of highway development to
suburbanization, sprawl and racial segregation).
78
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advocacy around the problems of particular geographic communities or on a specific policy
problem (such as transit equity).82
Perhaps even more than Title VII, Title VI makes plain the risk of leaving the Act behind
as reformers focus on questions of mobility, opportunity and spatial equality. Because Title VI
commands attention to race and ethnicity in a vast number of federal programs involving billions
of dollars, its regulatory infrastructure is too powerful not to employ as a tool for advancing
reform.
III. ANTIDISCRIMINATION’S PLACE
As a way of defining a problem, and as a legal intervention, antidiscrimination is no
doubt less central than it once was. In education, discriminatory discipline, racialized tracking,
and discriminatory student assignment policies may remain problems, but reformers’ attention is
understandably attuned to addressing disparities through reforms to improve the quality of
educational interventions. In employment, important concerns about discrimination and
occupational segregation in labor markets might be overtaken by the fate of workers in an
economy that leaves little room for less skilled and semi-skilled workers.83 Those interested in
inclusion and particularly in reducing racial and ethnic disparities would be gravely wrong to
frame their claims solely in terms of discrimination (whether a thin or robust account) without
engaging a broader set of reform strategies.
Still, the Civil Rights Act has important role to play in these domains. Understanding the
Act’s place requires recovering the Act’s central ambition as well as – to use the buzz word of
the moment – innovating to make the Act responsive to contemporary problems. Some may
argue that the Act in its current formulation is not worth such sustained attention. After all, much
innovation might be accomplished through new regulation, new statutes at the federal, state and
local level. Such innovation is reflected in statutes requiring targeted attention to the progress of
racial and ethnic minorities in education84 or by requirements that state actors address racial
disparities in their juvenile justice systems.85 Innovation is evident too in efforts to intervene to
address practices that may have a particular impact on minority or women but that address the
declining fates of all lower-wage workers such as skills training, the expansion of school-to-work
and apprenticeship programs, wage reform, reentry programs, the creation of new collective
For instance, groups that have been key in implementing and leveraging Title VI’s transportation
directives including environmental justice groups, public transit advocacy groups, civil rights
organizations and regionalism groups. See, Johnson, supra note 80, at 1406 n.303; id. at 1409 n.314; id. at
1411 n.321.
83
See, e.g., WILSON , supra note 3, at 26-27 (detailing the effect of decline of mass production on lowskilled workers). On the weakening of labor unions, see, e.g., Dorian T. Warren, The American Labor
Movement in the Age of Obama: The Challenges and Opportunities of a Racialized Political Economy, 8
PERSP. ON POL. 847, 848 (2010) (noting steep decline of labor unions’ share of the American workforce -- from over 30 percent of all workers in the 1940s to 12.3 percent of all workers in 2009). On the decline
of living wage jobs with career ladders, see WILSON, supra note 3, at 25.
84
See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 § 14006, 123 Stat. at 284-84;
http://www2.ed.gov/programs/racetothetop/executive-summary.pdf; No Child Left Behind, Pub. L. No.
107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 6301 note (Supp. II 2002).
85
See, e.g., Disproportionate Minority Contact, Act of Nov. 4, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-586, § 2(f)(3)(a)(ii),
106 Stat. 4982, 4993-94 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5633 (Supp. III 2005).
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bargaining regimes for low-wage workers,86 child care and sick leave policy87 or reform of the
inappropriate uses of employment background checks. 88
The reasons for continuing nevertheless to ask how the Civil Rights Act can bear on
contemporary questions are both pragmatic and expressive. The pragmatic argument is that it is
hard to make progress on inequality without attention to questions of how status — race,
ethnicity and gender — structure opportunity in distinct ways. The Civil Rights Act contains one
of the few places in American law that directs attention to these categories, and that provides
mechanisms for disrupting long-standing patterns of exclusion. More, it provides an expansive, if
imperfect, public and private regulatory infrastructure for advancing these goals. The second
perhaps more expressive reason is that the Act was never simply about antidiscrimination in the
narrowest sense. Even if so conceived by some of its drafters, it has absorbed a meaning through
implementation and cultural salience that gestures towards broader claims of citizenship and
inclusion.
CONCLUSION
As the Civil Rights Act of 1964 turns fifty, I am sympathetic to the idea that we should
demote discrimination. Recognizing this, social reformers increasingly organize their equality
claims around questions of opportunity, economic mobility, and diminishing disparities based on
geography and place. Yet, the meaning of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is not limited to narrow
notions of discrimination; it still has a role to play in structuring claims and advancing reforms in
these new domains. As reformers design new strategies, the Act’s initial structural reform
ambitions are worth remembering.

86

See WILSON, supra note 3, at 216-17 (proposing improvement in school to work transition programs,
skills training and other interventions). For an account of this statute, see Olatunde C. A. Johnson,
Disparity Rules, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 374 (2007).
87
See, e.g., THE THIRD SHIFT, supra note 59.
88
See NAT’L EMP’T L. PROJ, BAN THE BOX: MAJOR U.S. CITIES AND COUNTIES ADOPT FAIR HIRING
POLICIES TO REMOVE UNFAIR BARRIERS TO EMPLOYMENT OF PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS (2012),
available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/SCLP/2011/CityandCountyHiringInitiatives.pdf?nocdn=1 (listing
more than 40 cities and counties that have “banned the box”); Amy Traub, Ending Unjust Employment
Credit Checks, Demos, DEMOS, Feb. 7, 2012, http://www.demos.org/publication/ending-unjustemployment-credit-checks (reporting that seven states — Washington, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois,
California, Maryland, and Oregon — have passed laws prohibiting credit checks in employment).
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